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extent on factors that are beyond the control of both the concession-
aire and the government. On the other hand, forecasting traffic accu-
rately has proved to be a real challenge for both government planners
and private companies (5, 6). Because of those reasons, many gov-
ernments around the world are introducing mechanisms to mitigate
traffic risk in highway concessions.
One of the most interesting ways to mitigate traffic risk is the
establishment of flexible-term concessions (FTCs). The main char-
acteristic of this approach is that the contract will end when a prede-
termined amount of accumulated revenues, as fixed by the terms of
the contract, is ultimately reached. The most sophisticated approach
within the range of flexible-term mechanisms is the least present
value of the revenues (LPVR) mechanism, which has been devel-
oped and studied in detail by Engel et al. (7, 8). Even though FTC
approaches have been very well received by academics, its practical
implementation has been infrequent, mostly because of the strong
opposition to FTCs by concessionaires (9).
This paper has five objectives: first, to describe the way in which
FTCs work; second, to evaluate the advantages and drawbacks of
these mechanisms compared with other traffic risk mitigation mech-
anisms for both the government and the concessionaire; third, to
describe their practical implementation around the world; fourth, to
identify the reasons why these mechanisms have not been imple-
mented more often up to now; and fifth, to propose some measures
to increase the acceptability, and hence the use, of these mechanisms.
The first section (after the introduction) analyzes the problems of
correctly managing traffic risk, evaluates the accuracy of the conces-
sionaires in their traffic estimates, and provides some reflections on
traffic risk allocation in concession contracts. The second section
describes the characteristics of FTC contracts from both theoretical
and practical standpoints, analyzes the most relevant experiences in
several countries, and compares FTCs with other traffic risk mitiga-
tion mechanisms. The third section evaluates, on the basis of those
experiences, the reasons FTC contracts have not been implemented
more often. In this analysis, the author found that the main reason FTCs
have infrequently been implemented lies in the asymmetrical risk
profile that this mechanism presents for the concessionaire. Finally,
the fourth section provides lessons and recommendations for improv-
ing the acceptability of these mechanisms among concessionaires
while preserving their main original advantages.
TRAFFIC RISK ALLOCATION 
IN CONCESSION CONTRACTS
Accuracy of Traffic Estimates
The accuracy of traffic estimates is essential for the financial feasi-
bility of a concession because most of the concession revenues come
from traffic. It is necessary, however, to make a distinction between
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Highway concessions are becoming popular around the world. One of the
main issues in adequately designing concession contracts is how best to
allocate traffic risk. Many concession contracts, therefore, are incorpo-
rating traffic risk mitigation mechanisms to limit the amount of traffic
risk ultimately taken on by the concessionaire. One of the most interest-
ing approaches in the mitigation of traffic risk is the design of flexible-
term concessions (FTCs) that end automatically when a certain level of
accumulated traffic or revenues is reached. The concession duration may
be extended if real traffic becomes lower than expected and shortened
when real traffic is higher than expected. The aim of this paper is to sur-
vey and assess the implementation of FTCs to explore why these mecha-
nisms have so seldom been adopted. The author found that the main
reason for the scarce implementation of these mechanisms lies in the
strong opposition of the private sector to FTCs because of the asymmet-
ric risk profile that FTCs present. This risk profile means that the poten-
tial gains for the concessionaire are substantially limited, while potential
losses are not limited to nearly the same degree. The paper ends with
some recommendations for improving the acceptability of FTCs.
Investment in public infrastructure is a key factor for promoting eco-
nomic growth (1, 2). Many countries around the world are seeking new
ways of involving the private sector in the management and financing
of infrastructure through public–private partnerships (PPPs). Three
reasons lie behind this trend: first, the growing budgetary constraints
experienced by many economies in the world, which have led them
to look for resources outside the public budget; second, the search for
greater productive efficiency in the provision of public goods; and
third, the improvement of quality through better allocation of risks
and incentives (3).
One of the most common ways of implementing private participa-
tion in managing infrastructure is through the concession approach,
which consists basically of transferring responsibility for the construc-
tion, maintenance, and operation of the infrastructure to a private con-
sortium. In exchange, the consortium receives the right to charge a user
fee for a period of time, fixed or variable, as contractually agreed on in
advance. Infrastructure concessions incorporate some features that dis-
tinguish them from other construction and maintenance contracts, and
also from the basic asset privatization procedure (4).
One of the major concerns regarding infrastructure concessions
in the past few years has been that of calculating how best to allo-
cate traffic risk. On the one hand, traffic seems to depend to a great
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brownfield projects (those projects based on an already existing facil-
ity) and greenfield projects (those projects that have to be built from
scratch). Estimating traffic in brownfield projects is much easier
than in greenfield projects because the former have a track record of
traffic on which to base new estimates.
Correctly estimating traffic risk in highway concession has proven
to be quite an issue. The most complete study dealing with traffic
forecasting accuracy in toll road concessions is the study conducted
by Bain and Polakovic (6), which was based on 104 toll roads. This
study revealed that, unlike the government in forecasting traffic for
public roads (5), toll road concessionaires show an average bias toward
overestimating first year traffic by 20% to 30%. This study also iden-
tified that bank-commissioned forecasts consistently appear to be less
prone to large errors than those commissioned by bidders.
Traffic Risk Allocation and Renegotiation
The report conducted by Silva and published by the World Bank
(10) points out that one of the reasons some concession contracts
ultimately fail and often have to be renegotiated lies in traffic over-
estimation. Moreover, Athias and Nuñez (11) show that bidders tend
to bid more aggressively and strategically in institutional frameworks
in which renegotiating is easier. Consequently, the willingness to rene-
gotiate by the government is crucial for the bidders in their decision
to commit strategic errors.
According to Ping Ho (12), if the government is willing to rene-
gotiate, it implicitly encourages aggressive bidding. This situation
may cause a vicious cycle in the concession tender because compe-
tition for concession contracts is fierce. This vicious cycle means
that if governments show a historical track record of renegotiation,
bidders will be encouraged to inflate their forecast to justify aggres-
sive offers to increase their chances of winning the tender. Once the
contract is secured, the concessionaire assumes that the government
will renegotiate the agreement. Unfortunately, the government often
agrees to renegotiate to preserve its reputation, which, in turn, sets
a bad precedent and encourages future low-ball offers.
Renegotiations are undesirable but often necessary in incomplete
long-term contracts because events occur that are unpredictable
when the contract is written. However, renegotiations stemming
from bids that prove too aggressive should be avoided. This kind of
renegotiation, which is inefficient per se, ends up being very costly
for either the users or the taxpayers. Very often, the renegotiations
imply subsidies by the government or changes in the concession
contract that lead to toll increases or extensions in the duration of
the contracts (13).
Debate on How to Allocate Traffic Risk
There is a controversy regarding the stakeholder to whom traffic risk
should be allocated in concession contracts. On the one hand, traffic
seems to be hardly manageable by the concessionaire because traffic
depends mostly on variables that are outside the control of the conces-
sionaire. These variables include economic growth, urban develop-
ment, competition with other transport modes, and so on. Moreover,
allocating traffic risk to the concessionaire substantially increases the
financial cost of the project, which hinders the financial feasibility of
the concession. These reasons have led some governments to look
for mechanisms to untie completely the revenues of the concession-
aire from the ultimate traffic in the highway concession. The United
Kingdom, for instance, in its last generation of design, build, finance,
Vassallo 23
and operate contracts, has completely delinked the traffic outcome
from the revenues obtained by the concessionaire. The revenues
depend instead on such performance-based indicators as safety and
availability (14).
On the other hand, it is true that most of the businesses run by the
private sector naturally bear demand risk, so why not toll highways?
In addition, there are several reasons to support the allocation of traf-
fic risk to the concessionaire. First, maintenance and operation costs
depend substantially on traffic—particularly heavy traffic. Second,
the allocation of traffic risk to the concessionaire will encourage it
to adjust things in its control to attract more traffic—by designing a
good pricing policy, improving the quality of service in the road, and
so on. In spite of that, it is true that toll highways have different char-
acteristics compared with other industries. For instance, sunk irre-
versible costs are quite high in highways, and tolls are often regulated
so the concessionaire cannot adjust them to collect greater revenues.
These reasons imply that the consequences of traffic overestima-
tion on the financial performance of the concessionaire are more
significant than in other industries.
For this reason, some countries, such as Spain, Germany, Portugal,
and many in Latin America, which traditionally tended to allocate traf-
fic risk completely to the private sector (15) while maintaining the allo-
cation of traffic risk to the concessionaire, have decided to implement
mechanisms to mitigate traffic risk without fully decoupling the rev-
enues ultimately obtained by the concessionaire from traffic. Those
mechanisms include, for example, minimum income guarantees and
profitability caps (9).
FLEXIBLE-TERM CONCESSION CONTRACTS
Theoretical Foundation
The theoretical foundation of FTC contracts is quite straightforward.
The idea is to link the duration of the concession contract to the
attainment of a specified goal set in the contract. One approach is to
tie the concession duration to the number of users or to the accumu-
lated revenues obtained by the concessionaire. In other words, the
concession contract will end when a certain number of vehicles have
used the highway, or when the concessionaire has received a certain
amount of revenue from the users. Consequently, if traffic ultimately
turns out to be higher than expected, the duration of the concession
contract will be reduced from what had originally been estimated.
And the reverse is also true. In cases in which the actual traffic turns
out to be lower than what had been estimated, the concession contract
will be extended.
This approach means a substantial mitigation of the traffic risk
that is actually allocated to the concessionaire compared with fixed-
term contracts. However, traffic risk is not fully mitigated by using
this approach, for two reasons. First, the maintenance and operation
costs accumulated throughout the life of the contract become larger
for the concessionaire when the concession contract becomes longer
and vice versa. Second, the revenues obtained at the beginning of
the contract will have a higher value for the concessionaire than
those obtained at the end of the contract. As a consequence of both,
if in the end the actual traffic is higher than expected, the return
obtained by the concessionaire will be a little bit higher than the
return that would have been obtained with a fixed-duration contract.
In the opposite case, when the actual traffic turns out to be lower
than expected, the return obtained by the concessionaire will be a
little bit lower. This means that the ultimate return will go up and
down with traffic fluctuations, but not as much as it would have, in
either direction, if a fixed-term contract had been implemented. This
traffic risk allocation profile makes sense from the standpoint of the
theory of incentives, because the concessionaire will still have an
incentive to bring more traffic to the concession.
Engel et al. made two substantial contributions to the approach out-
lined above (7, 8). First, they suggested discounting the revenues
using a rate established in the contract (present value of the revenues)
to reflect the different value that revenues have for the concessionaire
at different times. Second, and perhaps more important, they proposed
using the present value of the revenues (PVR), not only as a means of
mitigating traffic risk, but also as the key variable in the tender of the
concession contract. This way, the bidder that in the end requires
the least preset value of the revenues will be granted the concession
contract. This is what Engel et al. called the LPVR mechanism.
Following is an explanation in greater detail of how this mecha-
nism works. Equation 1 shows the net present value estimated by one
bidder attending the tender in terms of the most relevant variables
that determine the economic balance of a concession contract.
where
NPV0 = net present value calculated in year 0,
I0 = initial investment estimated by the bidder (capital cost),
r = weighted average cost of capital (WACC),
n = concession term,
pi = price or toll in year i,
qi(pi) = actual traffic estimated by the bidder in year i depending
on pi, and
mi = maintenance and operation costs estimated by the bidder
in year i.
Each bidder will try to make its bid as competitive as possible to
have the greatest chance of being awarded the concession. The most
competitive bid under this restriction is always made when NPV0 = 0.
Making Equation 1 equal to zero, and restating its terms, results in
Equation 2.
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The left side of this equation shows the cumulative discounted
costs or present value of the costs (PVC) that the bidder expects to
bear in operating and constructing the concession, and the right side
shows the cumulative discounted revenues or PVR that the bidder
expects to obtain along the contract duration. Figure 1 shows the
evolution of the PVC and PVR curves along the time. The point at
which the two curves converge means that the concession has cov-
ered all its costs—according to a cost of capital equal to r. This is
the equilibrium point E (see Figure 1), which gives the expected
duration of the contract T0.
The auction mechanism based on the LPVR consists of granting
the concession to the bidder that requires the lowest PVR to recover
its costs, because it is supposed to be the most efficient bidder. The
concession will end when the real discounted flow of revenues
reaches the level required by the concessionaire. If the real traffic is
ultimately lower or higher than expected, the ultimate duration of the
concession will be either extended or reduced. This effect is shown
in Figure 2. If real traffic turns out to be lower than expected, the
PVR curve will be less steep than expected, so the ultimate duration
will be T2 instead of T0. Similarly, if real traffic turns out to be higher
than expected, the PVR curve will be steeper than expected, so the
ultimate duration will be T1 instead of T0. This profile substantially
mitigates traffic risk.
In the past few years, some academics have proposed slight mod-
ifications of the LPVR mechanisms. Nombela and de Rus (16) pro-
posed using the least present value of the net revenues (LPVNR)
instead of the LPVR to procure concession contracts. This mecha-
nism has two problems. First, using this mechanism, no traffic risk
is ultimately allocated to the concessionaire so in the end the con-
cessionaire does not have an incentive to bring more traffic to the
highway. And second, the concessionaire does not have an incen-
tive to reduce its operation costs because those costs are deducted
from the LPVNR that ultimately determines the length of the con-
cession. Vassallo (17 ) suggested the possibility of using short-term
concession contracts of fixed duration awarded under the LPVR
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FIGURE 1 Economic balance of concession contract.
approach. Once the contract has expired, the government will pay to
the concessionaire the difference between the LPVR requested and
the PVR obtained at the end of the contract. This mechanism, how-
ever, introduces a certain uncertainty, at the end of the concession,
on the government side.
Practical Experience Around the World
The use of FTCs was reported for the first time for the Second Severn
Bridge in the United Kingdom, which was awarded in 1990. The
length of the concession was pegged to a fixed target of “required
cumulative real revenue” (18). A figure was established in 1989 prices
that, once collected from toll income, would end the concession. A
similar experience is that of the Lusoponte concession in Portugal,
awarded at the end of the 1990s. The concession agreement was
designed so that the concession would expire no later than March
2028 or once a total cumulative traffic flow of 2,250 million vehicles
had been reached (19).
Other countries have also implemented FTC approaches. The gov-
ernment of Colombia decided to move from fixed to FTC contracts
at the end of the past decade. The first project to be awarded under
this approach was the “Malla Vial del Valle del Cauca,” which will
expire when the concessionaire reaches the accumulated revenues—
not discounted—requested in the tender, subject to a maximum
duration (20). The accumulated revenues required were also used as
one of the key variables in the tender phase of the concession. From
then on, many concession contracts have been awarded using this
approach, particularly in the past few years. It is still too early to
properly assess how this mechanism actually works, because most
of the contracts are either in the construction phase or in the first few
years of operation.
In the past few years, due to budgetary constraints, Portugal has
moved from shadow toll concessions to real toll concessions. This
shift has encouraged the government to implement traffic risk miti-
gation mechanisms. For this reason, the Litoral Centro Highway
in Portugal was awarded in 2003 under the LPVR approach. The
concession will come to an end when the net present value of the
total revenues reaches 6784 million, subject to a minimum period
of 22 years and a maximum period of 30 years. The concession ends
Vassallo 25
after 30 years, regardless of whether the consortium reaches the PVR
initially requested or not. Since the award of this concession, how-
ever, use of the LPVR has been discontinued in Portugal because of
the opposition of potential concessionaires.
Spain has a long experience in the development of concession
contracts, especially for highways. In the past few years, however,
the concession approach has also been used for funding other kinds
of infrastructure. An example is intermodal exchange stations in
urban areas, such as Madrid, Spain, which facilitate modal changes
for commuters. The revenues of these concessions are derived mostly
from a fee paid by the regional buses. In the concession contracts for
these stations, a flexible-term mechanism to mitigate demand risk
was implemented. The concession contracts will finish when the
cash flow discounted to a certain rate established in the contract
equals the original investment. In any case, the contract can be no
shorter than the original duration minus 5 years and no longer than
the original duration plus 5 years (21).
Undoubtedly, Chile has had the greatest experience in the imple-
mentation of the LPVR mechanism in the way that Engel et al.
designed it. The Chilean Public Works Concession Law defined the
possibility of using the sum of total revenues—discounted or not—
to be required by the concessionaire as the main economic variable
for tendering concessions. Since then, the LPVR has been used as a
procurement mechanism in some highway and airport concessions.
The bidding terms of the concessions awarded in Chile on the basis
of the LPVR approach allowed the concessionaire to choose a fixed
or variable discount rate.
The first concession using LPVR in Chile, and also the most suc-
cessful, was the Santiago–Valparaiso highway (Route 68). An analy-
sis of the procurement process of this highway can be found in work
by Gómez-Lobo and Hinojosa (22). The fixed rate was set in the bid-
ding terms as a risk-free rate of 6.5% plus a risk premium of 4%. The
variable rate was set as the monthly average real risk-free rate plus
a 4% risk premium. Four bidders attended the tender. Three chose
the fixed discount rate; only one chose the variable one.
The second attempt to tender a highway concession in Chile under
the LPVR mechanism took place at the beginning of 1999. The high-
way selected was the Costanera-Norte, an urban expressway in
Santiago, Chile, which was a very risky project for several reasons.
First, it was located in an urban area, thus competing with other
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FIGURE 2 Concession duration for various traffic scenarios.
roads and means of transportation. Second, part of the highway was
built on a subterranean level. And third, there was public opposition
to the project by residents of some city neighborhoods. Only one
consortium presented an offer, and it was ultimately disqualified
because the guarantee bond offered was below the level established
in the bidding documents. This experience proved that the LPVR
was not a magic wand that would enable risky projects to get off the
ground even without public support.
The economic recession endured by Chile between 1998 and 2002
prompted the government to vary the contracts terms of many con-
cessions in trouble by changing them from fixed-term to flexible-
term contracts. The only concessions that were not renegotiated were
the ones that had already been awarded under the LPVR approach,
demonstrating the LPVR approach as an extremely useful way to
mitigate the effects of an economic recession on the profitability of
the concession (9).
From then on, some road and airport projects have been awarded
under the LPVR approach in Chile. However, in spite of the inter-
est in this mechanism, in the past 15 years only four road conces-
sions out of the 28 presently granted were successfully awarded on
the basis of this approach.
Comparison with Other Traffic Risk
Mitigation Mechanisms
FTC contracts are not the only means of mitigating traffic risk. Other
work by the author (9) shows a taxonomy of the different traffic risk
mitigation mechanisms that have been implemented throughout the
world in the past few decades. Apart from flexible-term contracts, the
two most popular mechanisms are revenue-sharing limits and clauses
to rebalance the economics of the contract.
Revenue-sharing limits consist of establishing in the contract lower
and upper thresholds of allocating traffic risk between the conces-
sionaire and the government. If in 1 year the revenues fall below the
bottom band, the government will have to pay the concessionaire the
difference between the revenues guaranteed and the revenues col-
lected. If the revenues rise above the upper band, the concessionaire
has to share a percentage of the extra revenues collected with the gov-
ernment. This mechanism has been implemented in several countries,
such as Chile and Korea.
Rebalancing the economics of the contract consists of guarantee-
ing the “economic balance” of the concession, which is generally
interpreted as the expected project internal rate of return (IRR). Gen-
erally, the compensation measures to reestablish the economic bal-
ance of the contract are not preestablished, but rather negotiated when
the IRR falls above or below the target levels. This compensation can
include variation of tolls, change of the contract length, or provision
of public subsidies. This approach is implemented in countries such
as Spain and France.
FTCs have some advantages compared with the mechanisms out-
lined above. Unlike revenue-sharing mechanism, FTCs do not have
any impact on the public budget. In addition, this mechanism helps
to reduce renegotiation pressures more than revenue-sharing mech-
anisms. This fact was demonstrated in Chile, where many contracts
with revenue-sharing mechanisms were ultimately renegotiated after
the economic recession between 1998 and 2002, whereas the con-
tracts awarded on the basis of LPVR were not renegotiated. Com-
pared with the rebalancing of the economics of the contract, FTCs
have the advantage of making unnecessary uncertain renegotiations
in the future between the government and the concessionaire.
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WHY HAVEN’T FLEXIBLE-TERM CONCESSIONS
BEEN IMPLEMENTED MORE OFTEN?
FTCs are conceptually very attractive for several reasons. First, a
variable term is a highly effective compensation method that neither
commits public resources nor entails tariff increases. Second, LPVR
sets up a clear buyout price for the government. Third, LPVR reduces
renegotiation expectations so bidders have less incentive to inflate
their forecasts. However, FTC contracts have been implemented only
a few times in the countries in which this mechanism has been avail-
able. The main reason this mechanism has not been implemented
more often in Chile, Portugal, Spain, and other countries lies in the
strong opposition from the private sponsors to this approach. In
interviews conducted by the author, concessionaires revealed three
concerns about FTC contracts:
1. FTCs do not improve the ability of the project to meet its yearly
payback commitments to the lenders.
2. The variable length of the contract makes both the mainte-
nance and the operation of the concession more difficult to organize
because the end of the contract is uncertain.
3. FTCs always limit the upside profitability of the concessionaire
but not always the downside, so the mechanism is not symmetric.
The first concern means that FTCs do not necessarily improve the
yearly cash flow of the project. This issue is particularly important
during the first years of operation, in which the commitments to the
lenders are more demanding. In other words, FTCs do not improve
liquidity during the first years of operation of the project. Although
this statement is true, it is also true that the extension of the duration
of the concession contract will increase the value of the project for
the lenders, which would facilitate the rearrangement of the finan-
cial contracts in case the traffic turned out ultimately to be lower
than expected.
Consequently, even though FTCs do not improve the liquidity of
the project, they actually increase the value of the project that backs
the loan repayments, so banks involved should regard FTCs more
favorably than fixed-term ones. This statement was confirmed empir-
ically. The bond issued in 2002 to fund the Santiago–Valparaiso
highway—the first one awarded in Chile under the LPVR approach—
was the largest and least expensive infrastructure bond issued in Chile
until then. Because of the variability of the concession term, the bond
was structured with the requirement of mandatory prepayment in case
the concession duration turned out, in the end, to be shorter than the
maturity of the bonds originally issued to fund the concession.
The second concern has to do with the uncertainty in the organi-
zation of the operation of the concession contract. Practical experi-
ence demonstrates that this issue it is not of such great concern as it
might appear to be at first, because the concessionaire can—for two
reasons—reasonably estimate the end of the concession contract
several years in advance. First, LPVR discounts the revenues at a
certain rate, so the revenues during the first years have a much
greater influence on the ultimate contract duration than the rev-
enues of the last years. And second, the greater uncertainty regard-
ing traffic estimates—especially in greenfield projects—occurs at
the outset of the project operation. Later on, the estimating of the
evolution of traffic becomes much more predictable. These two rea-
sons explain why the concessionaire can arrive at a good approxima-
tion of the end of the concession after only a few years of operation
of the concession, and this, in turn, makes easier the organization
by the concessionaire of that operation.
The third concern is likely the most important one. FTCs cap the
upside, while they do not, at the same time, set a floor to the down-
side. The downside is caused by concession laws and contracts (such
as the ones in Spain, Portugal, and Chile), which tend to establish a
maximum duration for concession contracts. Consequently, although
the duration of a contract can always be reduced to mitigate the upside,
the necessary extension to avoid the downside in the case of a traffic
shortfall is not guaranteed beyond the maximum contract duration.
As Brealey et al. (23) claim, private shareholders expect a large upside
that compensates for the possibility of losing all their capital in very
risky and highly leveraged projects. The traffic risk profile resulting
from reliance on the LPVR approach turns out to be just the opposite
of the profile desired by would-be sponsors, because the upside is
very small while the downside remains significant.
For this reason, promoters regard this mechanism as asymmetrical.
This asymmetry was pointed out by Gómez-Ibáñez (24), who observes
that whereas the government has a call option on the project for the
remaining present value of the contract, the concessionaire does not
have a put option whereby it can sell the project to the government at
the end of the contract in exchange for the present value remaining.
Figure 3 shows the effect of the asymmetry. The results depicted
come from a simulation applied to a case study with average charac-
teristics of highway concessions in Spain. The characteristics of the
case study are 6300 million capital cost, 610 toll per trip, 3,650 mil-
lion trips per year, 2% expected annual traffic growth, 63 million
annual fixed maintenance cost, 62 per trip annual variable mainte-
nance cost, 7.5% WACC, and 30-year maximum legal duration of
the concession contract.
Figure 3 displays the rate of return ultimately attained by the con-
cessionaire in the annual traffic growth deviation (actual traffic
growth minus expected traffic growth) for fixed-term contracts and
flexible-term contracts based on LPVR with a discount rate equal to
the WACC. The continuous line shows the evolution of the rate of
return of the project the annual traffic growth deviation for fixed-
term concessions, and the broken line shows this relationship for
FTCs. For a traffic growth deviation equal to 0%, the ultimate prof-
itability of the concessionaire would be the same for both flexible
and fixed-term concessions and equal to the cost of capital of the
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project because the concessionaire would carry out its calculations
to obtain a rate of return equal to the WACC in case its predictions
are ultimately fulfilled.
Figure 3 sheds some light on the aspects previously discussed.
First, it is noteworthy that the traffic risk allocated to the concession-
aire in a fixed-term contract is much higher than it is in a flexible-
term contract, since the slope of the curve is much steeper. Second,
the risk profile depicted by fixed-term contracts is symmetrical on
both the upside and the downside, whereas the risk profile depicted
by FTC contracts is notoriously asymmetrical because the downside
is much more accentuated than the upside because of the maximum
term established in the contract.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Two lessons can be drawn and emphasized from the implementation
of FTC contracts. The first lesson is that establishing such a mecha-
nism to mitigate traffic risk has been shown to work quite well for the
government, even better than other traffic risk mitigation mechanisms,
in several ways:
• FTCs reduce the financial cost of the project because the lenders
perceive that traffic risk is substantially mitigated.
• FTCs set up a fairer traffic risk allocation approach.
• Unlike revenue-sharing approaches, FTCs provide an easy way
to mitigate traffic risk without committing public resources.
• Unlike revenue-sharing approaches, FTCs have been proven
effective in reducing the need for renegotiation of concession
contracts because traffic estimates made by the bidders are now
less significant in the tender.
• Unlike rebalancing the economics of the contract, FTCs estab-
lish an automatic way to determine the compensation to the conces-
sionaire. This aspect removes subjectivity and avoids future disputes
between the government and the concessionaires.
The second lesson is that concessionaires do not like this mecha-
nism because, even though FTCs reduce traffic risk, FTCs draw an
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asymmetric profile that is not convenient for the concessionaire.
In other words, the traffic risk reduction does not outweigh the dis-
advantage of an asymmetric risk profile. This occurs because capping
the upside mostly affects the shareholders (the concessionaire), who
see how their gains are constrained. However, the downside mostly
affects the lenders rather than the shareholders because infrastructure
project finance structures are often highly leveraged.
These lessons suggest that although making the concession term
flexible is a very attractive mechanism for governments, the level of
acceptance of this mechanism among concessionaires still leaves
room for improvement. To increase the acceptability of this mech-
anism among potential concessionaires, some measures, aiming at
increasing the potential upside and reducing the potential downside,
should be adopted.
The potential upside can be increased by establishing, for example,
a minimum duration for the contract in such a way that if the requested
LPVR is attained before the minimum duration is reached, the
contract still continues until the minimum duration is reached. This
way, the concessionaire can enjoy a certain upside if traffic ultimately
becomes higher than expected.
Reducing the downside is, however, more complicated. One solu-
tion could be for the government to allow an unlimited extension of
the contract duration. However, this solution seems to be difficult
to implement in practice because the maximum duration is often
limited by law. Moreover, even in the case that the law permits an
unlimited duration, it is still possible that the PVR curve becomes
so flat over the years—because of the effect of the discount rate—
that it never reaches the PVR requested. If this happens, the govern-
ment would not have the right to get the concession back, which for
a public asset does not make much sense.
If the maximum duration arrives and the concessionaire by that
time has still not reached the LPVR initially requested, the govern-
ment has the possibility of committing itself to pay the difference
between the LPVR requested and the PVR reached at that time. This
measure might pose a burden for the government, especially in times
of severe budgetary constraints. However, the government might
obtain that amount by retendering the concession and requiring the
bidders to pay a lump sum to the government equal to the difference
between the LPVR requested and the PVR reached at that time. This
solution seems to be feasible because at the end of the first conces-
sion period, the project will be a very profitable brownfield project
with a stable and consolidated traffic flow and few additional works
to be conducted by the new concessionaire.
From a practical standpoint, the author would claim that the use of
flexible-term contracts as a way of procuring concessions and miti-
gating traffic risks seems to be an interesting option that should be
allowed for by governments implementing highway concessions.
However, for this mechanism to be truly effective, it requires the risk
profile drawn by the contract to be more attractive for the private sec-
tor. The implementation of the measures described here will main-
tain the main advantages of flexible-term contracts and, at the same
time, will make flexible-term mechanisms much more attractive for
private promoters. Those measures will undoubtedly increase the
practical applicability of FTCs in the future.
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